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I. INTRODUCTION
In a case in which I represented the plaintiff, the wrongdoer himself tearfully 
acknowledged his role in the tragic accidental death of my client’s son.  It had a 
huge impact on the settlement of the case.  There would never have been a 
lawsuit if the same person had made the same comments to the mother during 
the 30-day period in which her son lay dying in the hospital, or during the three 
days his young body was at the funeral home.  The sad part in that case is that 
the defendant and his company wanted to express the same thought near the 
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time of the accident, but claimed to have been prohibited from doing so by their 
insurance carrier.1
The preceding anecdote illustrates the difficulty with which the U.S. 
legal system approaches the notion of apology.  The insight that apology 
may be an important tool in dispute resolution is one apparent even to an 
eight-year-old.2  However, the design and function of the U.S. legal system, 
to reduce disputes to dollar amounts, resist such intuition.3  The result is 
a culture so litigious that its corporations are required by the SEC to 
highlight their myriad lawsuits in their annual reports lest they remain 
open to further liability for misleading their shareholders.4
 1. Bruce W. Neckers, The Art of the Apology, 81 Mich. B.J. 10, 11 (2002); see 
also Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 Ohio St. L.J. 29, 33, 45–46 (1982) 
(arguing for an increased use of mediation among lawyers and discussing its lack of use 
resulting in a capacity for deafness to “ordinary good sense,” and arguing that mediation 
can lead to novel solutions, such as an apology, which could actually be in a client’s best 
interest (citing John D. Ayer, Isn’t There Enough Reality to Go Around? An Essay on 
the Unspoken Promises of Our Law, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 475, 489–90 (1978))).  Riskin 
offers an interesting anecdote from Professor Kenney Hegland: 
     In my first year Contracts class, I wished to review various doctrines we 
had recently studied.  I put the following: 
     In a long term installment contract, Seller promises Buyer to deliver 
widgets at the rate of 1000 a month.  The first two deliveries are perfect.  
However, in the third month Seller delivers only 999 widgets.  Buyer becomes 
so incensed with this that he rejects the delivery, cancels the remaining 
deliveries and refuses to pay for the widgets already delivered.  After stating 
the problem, I asked, “If you were Seller, what would you say?”  What I was 
looking for was a discussion of the various common law theories which would 
force the buyer to pay for the widgets delivered and those which would throw 
buyer into breach for cancelling the remaining deliveries.  In short, I wanted 
the class to come up with the legal doctrines which would allow Seller to crush 
Buyer. 
     After asking the question, I looked around the room for a volunteer.  As is 
so often the case with the first year students, I found that they were all either 
writing in their notebooks or inspecting their shoes.  There was, however, one 
eager face, that of an eight year old son of one of my students.  It seems that he 
was suffering through Contracts due to his mother’s sin of failing to find a 
sitter.  Suddenly he raised his hand.  Such behavior, even from an eight year 
old, must be rewarded. 
     “OK,” I said, “What would you say if you were the seller?” 
     “I’d say, ‘I’m sorry.’” 
Id. at 46. 
2. See Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law 
and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 461, 493 (1986). 
3. See id. at 464 (explaining the relative absence of apology in the U.S. legal 
system as possibly correlated to the legal system’s propensity to reduce all losses to 
economic terms and its juries’ awards of high damage amounts for injuries that do not 
easily reduce to quantifiable economic terms). 
 4. Jeffrey A. Berens, Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1955, COLO. LAW. (Colo. Bar Ass’n, Denver, Colo.), Feb. 2002, at 39, 42 
(discussing certain pleading requirements regarding securities class action litigation, 
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The U.S. treatment of apology stands in stark contrast to practices in 
other societies, such as Japan,5 where apology plays a central, if not 
dominant role in dispute resolution.6  In the United States, however, Federal 
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) provides that an admission of fault by a 
party-opponent is “not hearsay” and, therefore, not excluded from 
admissibility by the hearsay rule.7  Rule 801(d)(2) defines an admission 
by a party-opponent as, among other things, “the party’s own statement, 
in either an individual or a representative capacity . . . .”8  Consequently, 
even though an apology would fit the classical definition of hearsay as 
an out of court statement “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted,”9 the Federal Rules of Evidence treat it as nonhearsay 
and thus, as admissible evidence. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 408 applies to “compromise and offers to 
compromise” in civil cases and provides that “[e]vidence of . . . conduct 
or statements made in compromise negotiations” are not admissible to 
prove liability for or invalidity of a claim or its amount.10  The modus 
Berens notes that a corporation’s intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud its shareholders can 
be evidenced by its nondisclosure of material litigation per SEC regulation). 
 5. As the societies of the United States and Japan are so culturally distinct, it may 
seem counterintuitive, on first impression, to discern anything of significant value 
through considering Japanese law.  Indeed, given the debate regarding whether law 
shapes culture or culture shapes law, and given that the United States and Japanese 
cultures are so distinct, one might conclude that the Japanese propensity to apologize 
emanates from a culture so distinct from our own that it renders Japan a poor primer for 
any such analysis.  Recent studies, however, suggest that there appears to be a basic, 
universal human preference for an apology when one is wronged.  See discussion infra
Parts III–IV.  As such, it is apparent that the absence of fully protected apologies as a 
facet of formal dispute resolution in the United States may have more to do with the 
structure and flawed assumptions informing its legal system than any cultural barrier to 
considering the effectiveness of apologies. 
6. See Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 461–62, 472–73, 478–479, 482, 
488.
 7. FED. R. EVID. 801(d). 
8. Id.  Rule 801(d)(2) provides that a statement is not hearsay if: 
The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party’s own statement, 
in either an individual or a representative capacity or (B) a statement of which 
the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by 
a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or 
(D) a statement by the party’s agent or servant concerning a matter within the 
scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the 
relationship . . . . 
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 
 9. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 10. FED. R. EVID. 408.  The rule provides in relevant part: 
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operandi of this rule is the “promotion of the public policy favoring the 
compromise and settlement of disputes.”11  Therefore, an apology made 
during settlement negotiations generally should not be admissible to 
prove liability.  There are, however, significant limitations to the 
rule, including the fact that the apology must be made during and not 
before settlement negotiations, which runs counter to the underlying 
policy priority that the rule contemplates.12  Accordingly, it would scarcely 
be sound legal advice for a defense attorney to advise a client to deliver 
an apology that would leave the client open to liability. 
This Article joins the current debate regarding the proper relationship 
between apology and the law.13  Like Rule 408, this Article focuses 
(a) Prohibited uses.  Evidence of the following is not admissible on behalf of 
any party, when offered to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a 
claim that was disputed as to validity or amount, or to impeach through a prior 
inconsistent statement or contradiction: (1) furnishing or offering or promising 
to furnish—or accepting or offering or promising to accept—a valuable 
consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and (2) 
conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations regarding the claim, 
except when offered in a criminal case and the negotiations related to a claim 
by a public office or agency in the exercise of regulatory, investigative, or 
enforcement authority.  (b) Permitted uses.  This rule does not require exclusion if 
the evidence is offered for purposes not prohibited by subdivision (a).  Examples of 
permissible purposes include proving a witness’s bias or prejudice; negating a 
contention of undue delay; and proving an effort to obstruct a criminal 
investigation or prosecution. 
Id.
 11. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note (citing KENNETH S. BROUN,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 76, 251, at 138–40, 431–44 (6th ed. 2006)). 
12. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
1009, 1032–35 (1999). 
13. See, e.g., William K. Bartels, The Stormy Seas of Apologies: California 
Evidence Code Section 1160 Provides a Safe Harbor for Apologies Made After 
Accidents, 28 W. ST. U. L. REV. 141, 156 (2001); Max Bolstad, Learning from Japan: 
The Case for Increased Use of Apology in Mediation, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 545, 545 
(2000); William Bradford, “With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts”: Reparations, 
Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 1, 17 (2002); Charles R. Calleros, Conflict, Apology, and Reconciliation at Arizona 
State University: A Second Case Study in Hateful Speech, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 91, 125 
(1997); Cohen, supra note 12, at 1013; Taryn Fuchs-Burnett, Mass Public Corporate 
Apology, DISP. RESOL. J. (Am. Arbitration Ass’n, New York, N.Y.), May–July 2002, at 
26, 27; Elizabeth Latif, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies Tailored Toward Legal 
Solutions, 81 B.U. L. REV. 289, 320 (2001); Erin Ann O’Hara & Douglas Yarn, On 
Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1121, 1122 (2002); Aviva Orenstein, 
Apology Excepted: Incorporating a Feminist Analysis into Evidence Policy Where You 
Would Least Expect It, 28 SW. U. L. REV. 221, 223 (1999); Donna L. Pavlick, Apology
and Mediation: The Horse and Carriage of the Twenty-First Century, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 829, 831 (2003); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: 
An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 461–63 (2003) [hereinafter 
Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement]; Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What We Know 
and Don’t Know About the Role of Apologies in Resolving Health Care Disputes, 21 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1009, 1010 (2005) [hereinafter Robbennolt, Role of Apologies]; Lee Taft, 
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exclusively on civil cases.14  This Article adds to scholarly debates about 
apology and law by giving legal change a final push.  Namely, this Article 
provides language, and a rationale for the language, that makes federal 
protection for “full apologies” in civil cases possible.15
In particular, this Article considers the aforementioned limitations of 
Rule 408 and provides a critique of its effectiveness in facilitating its 
modus operandi of encouraging private settlements between adversarial 
parties.  Part II discusses apologies generally and considers the role they 
can play as a dispute resolution tool.  Part III then proposes an amendment 
to Rule 408, which would prevent full apologies offered during compromise 
negotiations from being admissible in civil cases.  The amendment to 
Rule 408 that this Article proposes also furthers the underlying policy 
priority of Rule 408 by encouraging private settlements.  Part IV provides 
support for the proposed amendment to Rule 408 by examining empirical 
Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135, 1135–36 
(2000); Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 462, 478–79; Brent T. White, Say You’re 
Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights Remedy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1261, 
1261 (2006); Deborah L. Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1165, 1166 (1997); Jonathan R. Cohen, Ethical Quandary: Advising the Client Who 
Wants to Apologize, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 1999, at 19, 19; see also Carl D. 
Schneider, What It Means to Be Sorry: The Power of Apology in Mediation, 17 
MEDIATION Q. 265, 265 (1999). 
 14. There are several rationales for this.  Both Rule 408 and this Article’s proposed 
amendment to Rule 408 address only civil cases.  As Jonathan Cohen explained: 
This is in contrast to most American evidence law which draws no distinction 
between civil and criminal cases.  Further, criminal charges are brought by the 
state rather than the injured person.  If the offender apologizes to the injured 
party in a civil case, this means that the defendant has apologized to the 
plaintiff.  In a criminal case, that correspondence is severed.  Criminal 
cases also present a risk of coerced confessions.  As reflected in the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination, constitutional law has long been 
wary of the potential for the state to abuse its power and coerce confessions, 
both false and true. 
Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 819, 
823 (2002) (footnotes omitted).  As Justice Frankfurter expressed, involuntary confessions are 
excluded 
not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods 
used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our 
criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system—a 
system in which the State must establish guilt by evidence independently and 
freely secured and may not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out 
of his own mouth. 
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540–41 (1961) (citations omitted).  In civil cases, 
there is typically little risk that a plaintiff will coerce a confession from the defendant; 
but in a criminal setting, that risk is quite real.  Cohen, supra, at 823. 
 15. See infra Part II for a definition of both “full” and “partial” apologies.
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evidence that suggests this amendment would, in fact, do more to 
encourage private settlements between adversarial parties than Rule 408 
currently does. 
Part V describes apology exclusionary rules that states have adopted 
and gauges the effectiveness of these exclusionary rules.  Part VI addresses 
critiques of the fully protected apology, which assert that such an 
exclusionary rule is not only fraught with moral ambiguity, but rewards 
bad actors engaging in strategic tactics by offering insincere apologies, 
thereby allowing them to escape proper punishment.16  This section 
reconsiders the resistance to the fully protected apology and suggests 
that this resistance stems from two ideas—the propensity of U.S. law to 
quantify harm in economic terms,17 and the belief that the United States 
has a naturally litigious culture.18  These critiques miss the point, as studies 
suggest,19 that the fully protected apology is both good business20 and 
consistent with U.S. cultural values.  Concluding, Part VII offers final 
thoughts on this Article’s proposed amendment to Rule 408. 
II. APOLOGIES AS A DISPUTE RESOLUTION TOOL
Authors differ as to the proper definition of what makes an effective 
full apology.  For example, Orenstein argues: 
At their fullest, apologies should: (1) acknowledge the legitimacy of the 
grievance and express respect for the violated rule or moral norm; (2) indicate 
with specificity the nature of the violation; (3) demonstrate understanding of the 
harm done; (4) admit fault and responsibility for the violation; (5) express 
genuine regret and remorse for the injury; (6) express concern for future good 
relations; (7) give appropriate assurance that the act will not happen again; and, 
if possible, (8) compensate the injured party.21
16. See generally Taft, supra note 13, at 1138. 
17. See Pavlick, supra note 13, at 854.  Explaining why the role of apology in 
litigation may be a poor fit within the U.S. legal system, Pavlick argues: 
In a rights-based, adversarial system, the moral and psychological interests of 
the parties are often overlooked.  The victim’s interests are routinely converted 
into a remedy or commodity with which the legal system is more familiar and 
better able to deal—namely money.  If interests are overlooked and replaced 
by a demand for money, then apology, which has no dollar value and no 
predictable value with regard to future occurrences, is of very little use in 
litigation. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
18. See Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 464. 
19. See Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement, supra note 13, at 482; see 
also discussion infra Part IV. 
 20. The fully protected apology could lead to greater occurrences of corporate 
apologies and fits well within the rubric of corporate social responsibility. 
 21. Orenstein, supra note 13, at 239. 
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Wagatsuma and Rosett state that to constitute a “meaningful apology,” 
the apologizer must acknowledge five things: (1) the harmful act happened, 
caused injury, and was wrongful; (2) the apologizer was at fault and 
regrets participating in the act; (3) the apologizer will compensate the 
injured party; (4) the act will not happen again; and (5) the apologizer 
intends to work for future good relations.22  Cohen identifies three elements: 
“(i) admitting one’s fault, (ii) expressing regret for the injurious 
action, and (iii) expressing sympathy for the other’s injury.”23  For the 
purposes of this Article, a “full apology” is defined as an expression of 
regret that acknowledges fault and is coupled with compensation for the 
harmed party.24  A “partial apology” is defined as an expression of 
remorse or regret without any admission of fault. 
When offenders apologize for their conduct, “the offense and the 
intention that produced it are less likely to be perceived as corresponding 
to some underlying trait of the offender.”25  As such, apologies influence 
beliefs about the general character of the offender, and when an apology 
is offered, the offender is viewed as having better character.26 The 
 22. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 469–70. 
 23. Cohen, supra note 12, at 1014–15. 
 24. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 487 (arguing that “[a]n apology without 
reparation is a hollow form,” Wagatsuma and Rosset note the centrality of compensation 
to an apology). 
 25. Seiji Takaku, The Effects of Apology and Perspective Taking on Interpersonal 
Forgiveness: A Dissonance-Attribution Model of Interpersonal Forgiveness, 141 J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 494, 495 (2001); see Edward E. Jones & Keith E. Davis, From Acts to 
Dispositions: The Attribution Process in Person Perception, in 2 ADVANCES IN 
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 219, 222–36 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1965) 
(describing correspondent inference theory). 
26. See, e.g., Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Children’s Reactions to 
Apologies, 43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 742, 746–52 (1982); Bruce W. Darby & 
Barry R. Schlenker, Children’s Reactions to Transgressions: Effects of the Actor’s 
Apology, Reputation and Remorse, 28 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 353, 360 (1989); Gregg J. 
Gold & Bernard Weiner, Remorse, Confession, Group Identity, and Expectancies About 
Repeating a Transgression, 22 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 291, 291–92 (2000); 
Marti Hope Gonzales et al., Victims as “Narrative Critics”: Factors Influencing 
Rejoinders and Evaluative Responses to Offenders’ Accounts, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 691, 698 (1994); Ken-ichi Ohbuchi et al., Apology as Aggression 
Control: Its Role in Mediating Appraisal of and Response to Harm, 56 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 219, 219–24 (1989); Ken-ichi Ohbuchi & Kobun Sato, Children’s
Reactions to Mitigating Accounts: Apologies, Excuses, and Intentionality of Harm, 134 
J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 11 (1994); Jennifer F. Orleans & Michael B. Gurtman, Effects of 
Physical Attractiveness and Remorse on Evaluations of Transgressors, 6 ACAD.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 49, 49 (1984); Bernard Weiner et al., Public Confession and Forgiveness, 59 
J. PERSONALITY 281, 285–86 (1991). 
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apologetic offender will therefore be perceived as less likely to engage 
in similar offending behavior in the future.27  Apologies also tend to 
reduce negative emotions such as anger, and increase levels of more 
positive emotions, such as sympathy for the offender.28  Indeed, medical 
malpractice survey research suggests that victims desire apologies and 
some would not have pursued litigation had an apology been offered.29
In addition, there is anecdotal evidence of injured parties who would not 
have pursued litigation if apologies were offered,30 of settlement 
negotiations coming to a halt over the issue of apology even after an 
agreement on an appropriate damage amount was reached,31 of plaintiffs 
who would have preferred an apology as part of a settlement,32 and of 
27. See, e.g., Gold & Weiner, supra note 26, at 291–92; Ohbuchi et al., supra note 
26, at 219–20; Orleans & Gurtman, supra note 26, at 52–53; Gary S. Schwartz et al., The
Effects of Post-Transgression Remorse on Perceived Aggression, Attributions of Intent, 
and Level of Punishment, 17 BRIT. J. SOC. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 293, 297 (1978); Weiner 
et al., supra note 26, at 285. 
28. See, e.g., Mark Bennett & Deborah Earwaker, Victims’ Responses to Apologies: 
The Effects of Offender Responsibility and Offense Severity, 134 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 457, 
462 (1994); Gold & Weiner, supra note 26, at 291–92; Ohbuchi et al., supra note 26, at 
219–20; Takaku, supra note 25, at 495; Weiner et al., supra note 26, at 286. 
29. See Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients’ and Physicians’ Attitudes Regarding 
the Disclosure of Medical Errors, 289 JAMA 1001, 1001, 1005–06 (2003) (finding that 
patients emphasized a desire to receive an apology following a medical error); Gerald B. 
Hickson et al., Factors That Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice Claims 
Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1361 (1992) (noting that twenty-four 
percent of families filed claims “when they realized that physicians had failed to be 
completely honest with them about what happened, allowed them to believe things that 
were not true, or intentionally misled them”); Charles Vincent et al., Why Do People Sue 
Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343 LANCET 1609, 
1612 (1994) (finding that thirty-seven percent of respondents said that they would not 
have sued had there been a full explanation and an apology, and fourteen percent 
indicated that they would not have sued had there been an admission of negligence); 
Amy B. Witman et al., How Do Patients Want Physicians to Handle Mistakes? A Survey 
of Internal Medicine Patients in an Academic Setting, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
2565, 2566 (1996) (finding that ninety-eight percent of respondents “desired or expected 
the physician’s active acknowledgement of an error.  This ranged from a simple 
acknowledgement of the error to various forms of apology” and that “[p]atients were 
significantly more likely to either report or sue the physician when he or she failed to 
acknowledge the mistake.”). 
30. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
31. See Schneider, supra note 13, at 274 (describing negotiations stalling “over the 
plaintiff’s demand for an apology, even after the sides had agreed on the damages to be 
paid!”) (emphasis omitted). 
32. See, e.g., Nathalie Des Rosiers et al., Legal Compensation for Sexual Violence: 
Therapeutic Consequences and Consequences for the Judicial System, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 433, 442 (1998); Piper Fogg, Minnesota System Agrees to Pay $500,000 to 
Settle Pay-Bias Dispute, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 14, 2003, at A12, available at
http://chronicle.com/weekly/v49/i23/23a01202.htm (describing class-action plaintiff’s 
disappointed reaction to the settlement: “I want an apology,” she said, “and I’m never 
going to get it.”  (internal quotation marks omitted)); Editorial, The Paula Jones 
Settlement, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1998, at C6. 
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occasions where a failure to apologize triggered litigation by adding 
insult to injury.33
To the extent that a place may be found for apology in the resolution 
of civil cases, U.S. law will be enriched and it will be better able to deal 
with the heart of what initially created the dispute between parties.34
Moreover, as Wagatsuma and Rosett explain, “society at large might be 
better off and better able to advance social peace if the law, instead of 
discouraging apologies . . . by treating them as admissions of liability, 
encouraged people to apologize to those they have wronged and to 
compensate them for their losses.”35  In such situations, lawsuits might 
never be filed, thereby reducing the amount of judicial resources 
consumed by such litigation.36  Without a mechanism that carves out a 
place for apology in civil cases, the U.S. justice system, which seeks to 
resolve conflicts through settlement, mediation, or alternative methods 
 33. Cohen, supra note 12, at 1010–11; Orenstein, supra note 13, at 243. 
 34. STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION,
AND OTHER PROCESSES 138 (5th ed. 2007); see generally Cohen, supra note 12, at  1019; 
Orenstein, supra note 13, at 242; Daniel W. Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law,
83 JUDICATURE 180, 180 (2000); Levi, supra note 13, at 1166.  In addition to the 
strategic benefits of apologies for settlement, which is the focus here, a number of 
nonstrategic benefits of apologies in civil cases are also posited.  Apologies may reduce 
negative emotions, repair relationships, fulfill a need to make reparations and to restore 
equity, make forgiveness possible, and facilitate psychological growth.  GOLDBERG ET 
AL., supra, at 138; see also Cohen, supra note 13, at 19; Michael E. McCullough et al., 
Interpersonal Forgiving in Close Relationships, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
321, 324 (1997); Orenstein, supra note 13, at 243–44; Elaine Walster et al., New 
Directions in Equity Research, 25 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 151, 163 (1973); 
Gerald R. Williams, Negotiation as a Healing Process, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 52–53; 
Charlotte vanOyen Witvliet et al., Please Forgive Me: Transgressors’ Emotions and 
Physiology During Imagery of Seeking Forgiveness and Victim Responses, 21 J. 
PSYCHOL. & CHRISTIANITY 219, 228 (2002); Charlotte Witvliet et al., Victims’ Heart 
Rate and Facial EMG Responses to Receiving an Apology and Restitution (Oct. 2–6, 
2002) (paper presented at the Forty-Second Annual Meeting of the Society for 
Psychophysiological Research) (abstract available in 39 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY S88 (Supp. 
2002)).
 35. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 488; see FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory 
committee’s note (discussing part of the rationale of excluding evidence of offers to 
compromise, the committee explains that “[t]he evidence is irrelevant, since the offer 
may be motivated by a desire for peace rather than from any concession of weakness of 
position”); see also supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of 
coupling apologies with compensation for apologies to be effective). 
 36. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 488; see also supra note 29 and 
accompanying text. 
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of dispute resolution, rather than trial, is without a tool that serves these 
policy priorities more effectively than Rule 408 currently does.37
III. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 408 
Rule 408 was enacted to address the inadequacies in the traditional 
common law rules.  Under common law, statements made during settlement 
negotiations were admissible in court unless posed as hypotheticals.38
As a result, when one preceded a statement by uttering the phrase 
without prejudice, it helped ensure that the statement would be deemed 
hypothetical.39  Rule 408 was created to address the difficulties that the 
common law reliance on legal formalisms presented to parties who may 
have been otherwise inclined to settle.  The Federal Rules of Evidence 
Advisory Committee noted: 
An inevitable effect [of these common law rules] is to inhibit freedom of 
communication with respect to compromise . . . .  Another effect is the generation of 
controversy over whether a given statement falls within or without the protected 
area.  These considerations account for the expansion of [Rule 408] to include 
evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations, as well as 
the offer or completed compromise itself.40
The underlying policy rationale of Rule 408 is to create a protected 
space between parties so as to encourage private settlement.41  Rule 408, 
however, contains significant limitations that all but eviscerate this 
rationale.  First, although Rule 408 classifies evidence as inadmissible 
only when it is used “to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a 
claim,”42 evidence may be offered for another purpose, such as “proving 
a witness’s bias or prejudice.”43  Courts have construed this language to 
mean that such evidence is admissible when used to impeach a witness.44
The practical implication of this interpretation is that if an offender 
apologizes during settlement negotiations and then denies doing so at 
 37. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 495; see Williams v. First Nat’l Bank of 
Pauls Valley, 216 U.S. 582, 595 (1910) (“Compromises of disputed claims are favored 
by the courts . . . .”); see also infra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 38. M.C. Slough, Relevancy Unraveled, 5 U. KAN. L. REV. 675, 720 (1957) 
(explaining that “when made in hypothetical form, offers are inadmissible for the reason 
that they cannot be treated as an assertion representing the party’s actual belief”). 
39. See Robert A. Weninger, Amended Federal Rule of Evidence 408: Trapping 
the Unwary, 26 REV. LITIG. 401, 430 (2007). 
 40. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note. 
 41. FED. R. EVID. 408 Senate Judiciary Committee report (explaining that “[t]he 
purpose of this rule is to encourage settlements which would be discouraged if such 
evidence were admissible”). 
 42. FED. R. EVID. 408(a). 
 43. FED. R. EVID. 408(b). 
 44. Cohen, supra note 12, at 1034 (describing the impeachability inference as a 
loophole within Rule 408 that “may de facto swallow the rule”). 
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trial, the apology might be deemed admissible.45  Therefore, if the reasoning 
behind Rule 408 is to provide parties with enough certainty so as to 
allow them to speak freely without fear that their statements will be 
deemed admissible at trial, Rule 408 is fatally flawed. 
Second, the aforementioned limitations notwithstanding, Rule 408 
neither precludes such evidence from pre-trial discovery nor proscribes 
such evidence from being revealed to third parties.46  Third, Rule 408 
only bars those apologies made during “compromise negotiations,” 
which poses two problems: (1) It is not particularly clear as to when a 
compromise negotiation has begun; and (2) although a sincerely 
apologetic offender may want to apologize immediately after the harm, 
Rule 408 does not clearly classify such an apology as inadmissible.47
Both of these problems serve to effectively obviate the creation of the 
protected space between parties that Rule 408 considers essential to 
making private settlements more likely.  From this perspective, the 
central legal tension in the effective use of apology as an effective 
dispute resolution tool is not cultural—it is evidentiary. 
Courts in the United States have long recognized a public policy in 
favor of private settlement between adversarial parties.48  This policy is 
informed by the belief that private settlements make a more efficient 
court system49 and reduce the adverse impact on the parties caused by 
litigation.50  Private dispute resolution also allows the parties to craft 
resolutions that best fit their needs and desires.51
45. Id. at 1035. 
46. See Bolstad, supra note 13 at, 572–73 (arguing that Rule 408 offers “scant 
protection for apologies made during the course of mediation,” Bolstad argues that the 
revelation of an apology to third parties may result in the apologizer being forced to 
defend numerous other suits resulting from such revelation). 
 47. FED. R. EVID. 408; FED. R. EVID. 408 House Judiciary Committee report 
(enacting a change to Rule 408 and reversing an earlier judicial practice which deemed 
statements offered in compromise negotiations admissible in subsequent litigation 
between the parties, the House Judiciary Committee notes that, “[f]or one thing, it is not 
always easy to tell when compromise negotiations begin, and informal dealings end”). 
48. See St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Mont. Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650, 656 
(1898) (“[S]ettlements of matters in litigation, or in dispute, without recourse to 
litigation, are generally favored . . . .”); see also Keahole Def. Coal., Inc. v. Bd. of Land 
& Natural Res., 134 P.3d 585, 605 (Haw. 2006) (“[T]his court has acknowledged the 
strong public policy in favor of settlement of claims.”). 
49. See Long Term Mgmt., Inc. v. Univ. Nursing Care Ctr., Inc., 704 So. 2d 669, 
673 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (“Settlements are highly favored as a means to conserve 
judicial resources . . . .”). 
50. See Vill. of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that 
successful settlements avoid the expense and delay of litigation); see also David Luban, 
RUNNELS.UPDATEDPRINTER 3/12/2009 10:17:20 AM
148
Given such an unambiguous judicial preference for private settlements, 
one would expect the federal judiciary to continue taking affirmative 
steps in facilitating this policy.  In line with both judicial preference and 
the public policy underlying Rule 408, this Article proposes that the 
language of Rule 408 be amended to protect a full apology52 in four 
specific ways: (1) defining compromise negotiations as attaching immediately 
after an injury; (2) rendering an apology offered during compromise 
negotiations undiscoverable; (3) proscribing the admissibility of such 
apology to impeach a witness; and (4) proscribing the revelation of such 
apology to third parties.  Incorporating the aforementioned definition of 
compromise negotiations, this Article’s proposed Rule 408 would read: 
(a) Prohibited uses.  Evidence of the following is not admissible on behalf of 
any party, when offered to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a claim 
that was disputed as to validity or amount, or to impeach through a prior 
inconsistent statement or contradiction: (1) furnishing or offering or promising 
to furnish—or accepting or offering or promising to accept—a valuable 
consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and (2) 
any and all statements, affirmations, gestures, or conduct expressing apology, 
fault, sympathy, commiseration, condolence, compassion, or a general sense of 
benevolence made to any party, including any third party, in compromise 
negotiations regarding the claim, except when offered in a criminal case and the 
negotiations related to a claim by a public office or agency in the exercise of 
regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority.  (b) Permitted use.  This rule 
does not require exclusion if the evidence is offered for purposes of proving an 
effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution. 
Such an amendment would bring Rule 408 closer in line with the rule’s 
original rationale.53
IV. WHAT EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE TELLS US
Professor Jennifer K. Robbennolt conducted a comprehensive empirical 
analysis regarding the role of apology in settling disputes, and her 
Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2621 (1995) 
(arguing that “[l]awsuits are expensive, terrifying, frustrating, infuriating, humiliating, 
[and] time-consuming . . . .”). 
51. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of 
the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 502 (1985) (noting that 
parties are more likely to abide by agreements they make themselves). 
52. See supra Part II for the Author’s definition of a full apology. 
 53. FED. R. EVID. 408 Senate Judiciary Committee report (discussing the 
underlying rationale behind Rule 408, the Senate Judiciary Committee notes that “[t]he 
exception for factual admissions was believed by the Advisory Committee to hamper 
free communication between parties and thus to constitute an unjustifiable restraint upon 
efforts to negotiate settlements—the encouragement of which is the purpose of the 
rule.”).  Indeed, when explaining this rationale, the Advisory Committee went further in 
discussing the principle upon which Rule 408 is founded, noting that “[a] more 
consistently impressive ground is promotion of the public policy favoring the 
compromise and settlement of disputes.”  Id.
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findings suggest that a codification—such as the one proposed in this 
Article—will enhance Rule 408.54  In her study, Robbennolt required her 
subjects to visit a website to read an accident hypothetical in which one 
party was injured.55  The participants were assigned the role of the 
injured party and were asked to evaluate a settlement offer from the 
offending party.56  Robbennolt introduced numerous control variables 
into the examination which enabled her to gauge how different types of 
apologies affected the likelihood of settlement and, most interestingly, 
whether a legally protected apology such as the one proposed here or an 
apology without protection affected the outcomes in any demonstrable 
manner.57
In describing the differing types of apologies, Robbennolt adopted 
language commonly used in recent scholarship regarding the utility of 
apology in fostering settlement between adversarial parties.58  A “partial 
apology” is one in which the offending party expresses sympathy and 
hope for a rapid recovery, but does not accept responsibility for the 
accident causing the injury.59  In her study, Robbennolt’s offender offered 
the following partial apology: “I am so sorry that you were hurt.  I really 
hope that you feel better soon.”60  A “full apology” includes the same 
expression of sympathy contained in the partial apology, but adds an 
acknowledgment of responsibility: “I am so sorry that you were hurt.  
The accident was all my fault.  I was going too fast and not watching 
where I was going until it was too late.”61
The results of Robbennolt’s analysis were unambiguous. Those participants 
receiving a full apology were much more inclined to accept the settlement 
54. See generally Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement, supra note 13, at 
462.
55. Id. at 483. 
56. Id.
57. Id. at 484.  Robbennolt controlled for several other variables in her empirical 
examination in addition to those mentioned here.  For the purposes of this Article’s 
proposal, however, variables were not mentioned if they were not material to support the 
general notion that a legally protected apology has a favorable direct correlation with the 
inclination of parties to settle outside of court.  See generally id.
58. See Mitchell A. Stephens, I’m Sorry: Exploring the Reasons Behind the 
Differing Roles of Apology in American and Japanese Civil Cases, 14 WIDENER L. REV.
185, 194 (2008).
59. See Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement, supra note 13, at 468–69. 
60. Id. at 484 n.112. 
61. Id.
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offer62 and found that the “offender who offered a full apology was seen 
as experiencing more regret, as more moral, and as more likely to be 
careful in the future than one offering a partial or no apology.”63  As to 
the effects of whether evidentiary rules protected an apology or not, 
Robbennolt found: 
Differences in evidentiary rules did not produce significant differences in 
settlement rates nor did they produce differences in participants’ perceptions 
and attributions.  Importantly, there were no effects of the evidentiary rules on 
ratings of the sufficiency or sincerity of the apology given.  Participants were, 
however, aware of the differences in the rules as they assessed the scenario; 
analysis of participants’ ratings of the likely motives for the apology revealed 
that apologies that were not protected by an evidentiary rule were seen as less 
likely to have been motivated by desire to avoid a lawsuit.  Thus, participants 
were aware of the content of the different evidentiary rules, but did not adjust 
their assessments of the apologies received in response to those rules.64
Robbennolt further offers that there is “at present, no evidence to suggest 
that protected apologies will be less effective or less valued by claimants 
than unprotected apologies.”65  Moreover, she argues that “providing 
evidentiary protection for apologies may serve to encourage the offering 
of apologies, or at least to signal that apologies are a desired response to 
an injury-producing event, without diminishing the value and effectiveness 
of apologies so offered.”66  Thus, the full apology, whether protected or 
not, was viewed by the participants as more satisfactory than either a 
partial apology or no apology.  With this data, Robbennolt empirically 
established that apologies affect harmed parties’ inclination to accept or 
reject a settlement offer and that “[o]nly the full, responsibility-accepting 
apology increased the likelihood that the offer would be accepted.”67
The partial apology, by point of comparison, “increased participants’ 
uncertainty about whether or not to accept the offer.”68
62. Id. at 485–86.  When no apology was offered, 52% of participants indicated 
that they would definitely or probably accept the settlement offer, while 43% would 
reject it, leaving 5% uncertain.  Id.  When a partial apology was offered, 35% of 
participants were inclined to accept the offer, 25% were inclined to reject it, and 40% 
were uncertain.  Id. at 486.  When a full apology was offered, 73% of participants were 
inclined to accept the settlement offer, with only 13%–14% each rejecting the offer and 
remaining uncertain.  Id.
63. Id. at 487 (footnotes omitted). 
64. Id. at 490–91 (footnotes omitted). 
65. Id. at 504. 
66. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
67. Id. at 491. 
68. Id.
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V. STATE STATUTES THAT ENCOURAGE APOLOGIES
To date, thirty-five states—consistent with their characterization by 
Justice Brandeis as laboratories of democracy69—have enacted statutes 
designed to encourage apologies by providing evidentiary protections 
similar to the one proposed in this Article.70  In 1986, Massachusetts 
became the first state to adopt an evidence rule designed to proscribe 
apologetic expressions of sympathy and benevolence from admissibility 
when used to prove liability in civil cases.71  The statute provides: 
Statements, writings or benevolent gestures expressing sympathy or a general 
sense of benevolence relating to the pain, suffering or death of a person 
involved in an accident and made to such person or to the family of such person 
shall be inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability in a civil action.72
The catalyst and rationale of this statute is rooted in an ill-fated event, as 
described by Lee Taft: 
In the 1970s a Massachusetts legislator’s daughter was killed while riding her 
bicycle.  The driver who struck her never apologized.  Her father, a state 
senator, was angry that the driver had not expressed contrition.  He was told that 
the driver dared not risk apologizing, because it could have constituted an 
 69. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social 
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
 70. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2605 (2008); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160(a) (Deering 
2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135(1) (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-184d(b) 
(2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4318(b) (2006); FLA. STAT. § 90.4026(c)(2) (Supp. 
2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-37.1 (Supp. 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1 (Supp. 
2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-207(1) (Supp. 2008); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-1901(b) 
(Supp. 2008); IND. CODE § 34-43.5-1-4 (Supp. 2008); IOWA CODE § 622.31 (Supp. 
2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3715.5 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2907(2) 
(Supp. 2007); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-920 (LexisNexis 2006); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23D (2008); MO. REV. STAT. § 538.229 (2008); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 26-1-814 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-1201(1) (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-
E:4 (Supp. 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 413 (2007); H.B. 1333, 60th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (N.D. 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.43(A) (West Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 63, § 1-1708.1H(A) (Supp. 2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.082 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 19-1-190(B) (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-12-14 (2008); TENN. R. EVID.
409.1(a) (2008); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061 (Vernon 2008); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78B-3-422(2) (Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1912 (Supp. 2007); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-52.1 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.64.010(2) (Supp. 2008); W.
VA. CODE § 55-7-11a(b)(1) (Supp. 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-130(a) (2007). 
71. See Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement, supra note 13, at 471. 
 72. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23D (Supp. 2008). 
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admission in the litigation surrounding the girl’s death.  Upon his retirement, the 
senator and his successor presented the legislature with a bill designed to create 
a “safe harbor” for would-be apologizors [sic].73
Because the language of the Massachusetts law neglected to describe 
what constitutes “[s]tatements, writings or benevolent gestures expressing 
sympathy or a general sense of benevolence,”74 it remained unclear as to 
whether an apology containing a clear admission of fault would be 
admissible.75
Texas, the next state to adopt such legislation, resolved this uncertainty 
by adopting similar language to the Massachusetts statute while making 
it clear that “a communication, including an excited utterance . . . which 
also includes a statement or statements concerning negligence or 
culpable conduct pertaining to an accident or event, is admissible to 
prove liability . . . .”76  Thus, an admission of fault embedded within an 
apology is admissible evidence.  By way of example, if a party driving a 
vehicle hit another party and the driver uttered the phrase, “I’m sorry 
that you were hurt,” the statement would be inadmissible, as it is an 
apologetic statement of sympathy.  If, on the other hand, the driver said, 
“I’m sorry that I hurt you,” the statement would be admissible, as it is a 
clear apologetic admission of fault.77  Such codification, therefore, effectively 
renders apologetic statements of sympathy or benevolence partial apologies.  
Subsequently, several other states enacted rules of evidence to protect 
such partial apologies.78  Such apologies are said to encourage contrition 
and, consequently, promote the settlement of civil cases.79  Robbennolt’s 
study, however, makes plain that these partial apologies may very well 
be perceived by a harmed party to be no apology at all, and would thus 
be unlikely to encourage settlement between the parties.80
Though no hard empirical data exists that shows a positive correlation 
between partial apologies and lower civil litigation rates, states continue 
to pass and consider such partial apology legislation.  A number of 
states, however, have narrowed their protections from civil cases in 
73. See Taft, supra note 13, at 1151 (footnote omitted). 
 74. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23D (Supp. 2008). 
75. See Cohen, supra note 14, at 827–28. 
 76. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061(c) (Vernon 2008). 
77. See Cohen, supra note 14, at 829–30 (discussing Rule 408’s structural 
deficiencies). 
78. See supra note 70. 
79. See generally Cohen, supra note 12, at 1011; Cohen, supra note 14, at 843; 
Latif, supra note 13, at 291; Orenstein, supra note 13, at 223; Shuman, supra note 34, at 
180.
80. See Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement, supra note 13, at 491 
(discussing the lack of a correlation between the offering of a partial apology and the 
harmed party’s inclination to forgo litigation). 
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general to focus exclusively on civil cases involving medical malpractice.81
This change is perhaps due to the high degree of trust and intimacy that 
defines the relationship between doctor and patient as well as the 
increasingly high-profile nature of medical malpractice litigation.82
Victims of medical malpractice rely on the legal profession to provide 
them with information regarding how the medical error occurred, what 
constitutes just compensation,83 and, notably, how to receive an apology 
from their doctors.84  Such reliance, however, is proving to be 
increasingly ill-founded.85  Even though few cases result in the victim 
filing a lawsuit86 and even fewer cases result in lawsuits that end with 
large verdicts,87 a recent surge of large jury awards has been driving 
medical premiums higher and encouraging plaintiffs and their lawyers to 
pursue litigation.88  The U.S. General Accounting Office’s 2003 report 
81. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-1708.1H(A) (Supp. 2008).  The Oklahoma 
statute provides: 
In any medical liability action, any and all statements, affirmations, gestures, 
or conduct expressing apology, sympathy, commiseration, condolence, compassion, 
or a general sense of benevolence which are made by a health care provider or 
an employee of a health care provider to the plaintiff, a relative of the plaintiff, 
or a representative of the plaintiff and which relate solely to discomfort, pain, 
suffering, injury, or death as the result of the unanticipated outcome of the 
medical care shall be inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability or 
as evidence of an admission against interest. 
Id.; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.43(A) (West Supp. 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-1-130(a) (2007). 
82. See generally Robbennolt, Role of Apologies, supra note 13, at 1010 
(discussing the increasing debate regarding medical error in medical literature, legal 
literature, and the popular press). 
83. See Richert Quinn, Med. Dir., COPIC, COPIC’s 3Rs Program: Recognize, 
Respond to and Resolve Patient Injury, available at http://sorryworks.net/files/ 
3rsaosreq.ppt (last visited Jan. 20, 2009); see also Max Douglas Brown et al., Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Strategies in Medical Malpractice, 6 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L.
249, 265–66 (2003). 
 84. Carol Patton, Physicians Wary of JCAHO Rules on Medical Errors,
PHYSICIANS FIN. NEWS, Sept. 15, 2001, http://www.doctorquality.com/www/news/news_ 
091501.htm (discussing that patients and their families first want the facts, then an 
apology, and then money, which comes in a “distant third”). 
 85. Quinn, supra note 83.  The litigation system is designed as an adversarial 
system that is defined by drawn-out and expensive disputes, which provides unfair 
compensation and often shatters the physician-patient relationship.  Id.
86. See Jeffery O’Connell & James F. Neale, HMOs, Cost Containment, and Early 
Offers: New Malpractice Threats and a Proposed Reform, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 287, 294 (1998). 
87. Id. at 295. 
88. See OFFICE OF DISABILITY, AGING, AND LONG-TERM CARE POLICY, U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., UPDATE ON THE MEDICAL LITIGATION CRISIS: NOT THE 
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on escalating medical malpractice premiums found that the primary 
reason for this rise was the losses incurred by insurance companies in 
medical malpractice litigation.89  As a result of this vicious cycle, doctors 
and hospitals are currently facing a crisis of increasing malpractice 
insurance costs.90  One increasingly utilized method to break this cycle, 
however, is for a doctor to say “I’m sorry” before saying “see you in court.”91
Hospitals are progressively becoming open to the notion that an 
apology can lower litigation rates and encourage healthier relationships 
between doctors and their patients.92  Unsurprisingly, the initial apprehension 
of apologizing stems from defense attorneys whose mantra in situations 
of medical error is “deny and defend.”93  As Lucian Leape of Harvard 
Medical School explained: 
For decades, lawyers and risk managers have claimed that admitting 
responsibility and apologizing will increase the likelihood of a patient filing a 
malpractice suit and be used against the doctor in court if they do sue.  However, 
this assertion, which on the surface seems reasonable, has no basis in fact.  
There is to my knowledge not a shred of evidence to support it.  It is a myth.94
RESULT OF THE “INSURANCE CYCLE” (2002), http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/mlupd2.htm.  
The median jury award has more than doubled from $475,000 in 1996 to $1,000,000 in 
2000. Id.
 89. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE:
MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES 3–4 (2003).  The 
report explains that the increase in “paid losses” increases premiums for several reasons: 
First, higher paid losses on claims reported in current or previous years can 
increase insurers’ estimates of what they expect to pay out on future claims.  
Insurers then raise premium rates to match their expectations.  In addition, 
large losses . . . on even one or a few individual claims can make it harder for 
insurers to predict the amount they might have to pay on future claims. 
Id. at 22.  The report further argues that the tendency to expect higher losses intuitively 
results in higher premium rates.  Id.
 90. Hillary Rodham Clinton & Barack Obama, Making Patient Safety the 
Centerpiece of Medical Liability Reform, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2205, 2205 (2006). 
91. See Kevin Sack, Doctors Start to Say ‘I’m Sorry’ Long Before ‘See You in 
Court,’ N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2008, at A1, A21 (describing the success of voluntary 
disclosure and fault-admitting apology programs in hospitals across the country).  
Although these disclosure programs developed independently of the apology legislation 
discussed in this Article, they provide clear evidence of the correlation between fault-
admitting apologies and lower litigation rates.  Id. Since enacting the disclosure 
program, the University of Michigan Health System has seen existing claims and 
lawsuits drop from 262 in August 2001 to 83 in August 2007.   Moreover, the number of 
malpractice filings against the University of Illinois dropped by half since the initiation 
of the disclosure program two years ago.  Id.
92. Id.
 93. Telephone Interview with Doug Wojcieszak, Founder & Spokesperson, Sorry 
Works! Coalition (May 23, 2008). 
 94. Lucian L. Leape, Full Disclosure and Apology—An Idea Whose Time Has 
Come, PHYSICIAN EXECUTIVE,  Mar.–Apr. 2006, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0843/ 
is_2_32/ai_n16123939. 
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Debunking this myth is the mission of the Sorry Works! Coalition, a 
grassroots organization comprised of physicians, insurers, patients, attorneys, 
hospital administrators, and researchers.95  The Coalition pursues three 
central goals: (1) educate the public and stakeholders about the power of 
disclosure and apology; (2) serve as an organizing force and central 
clearinghouse for information on full-disclosure methods; and (3) lobby 
for the development of the Sorry Works! programs in hospitals across 
the nation.96  As defense attorneys promulgate the “deny or defend” ethos 
that has taken root in hospitals across the country,97 the Coalition 
continues to support the passage of apology legislation.98
One such piece of legislation, the National Medical Error Disclosure 
and Compensation Program, the National MEDiC Act,99 was drafted by 
Doug Wojcieszak, the Coalition’s founder, and co-authored by then-
Senators Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama.100  The bill was initially 
intended to provide protection for full apologies in medical malpractice 
 95. The Sorry Works! Coalition, http://www.sorryworks.net (last visited Jan. 20, 
2009). The Sorry Works! Coalition website is a comprehensive source for all issues and 
developments involving full disclosure. 
96. See generally Doug Wojcieszak et al., The Sorry Works! Coalition: Making the 
Case for Full Disclosure, 32 JOINT COMMISSION J. ON QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 344 
(2006).
 97. Doug Wojcieszak, Founder & Spokesperson, Sorry Works! Coalition, Sorry 
Works! Testimony Before the South Carolina Senate (Aug. 16, 2005), available at 
http://www.sorryworks.net/media34.phtml.  Defining and critiquing the “deny and defend” 
ethos, Wojcieszak testified: 
This is where defense lawyers sweep in [to] tell doctors and medical staff to 
keep quiet.  I’m here to tell you today that deny and defend is a tried and failed 
risk management strategy.  It produces anger and it’s a big part of the reason 
we have a medical liability crisis. 
Id.  Tim McDonald, the chief safety officer at the University of Illinois Medical Center 
Chicago, recently delivered a speech at Loyola University Chicago and retold a story 
about how in interviewing defense firms, he opened with the following hypothetical 
situation: A patient undergoes surgery to have a leg removed, but doctors mistakenly 
amputate the wrong leg.  There is no question the hospital is at fault.  When McDonald 
asked how the defense firms would handle the botched surgery, twelve of the sixteen 
firms counseled deny and defend, and one even advocated “altering the medical record to 
imply that the ‘wrong leg’ needed to be removed anyway!”  New Disclosure Program at 
University of Illinois Medical Center in Chicago, SORRY WORKS! NEWSLETTER (Sorry 
Works! Coal., Glen Carbon, Ill.), June 25, 2007, http://www.sorryworks.net/uofi.phtml. 
98. See Sorry Works! Coalition, http://www.sorryworks.net (last visited Jan. 20, 
2009).
 99. National Medical Error Disclosure and Compensation Program, S. 1784, 109th 
Cong. § 935(d)(1)(B) (2005). 
 100. Telephone Interview with Doug Wojcieszak, supra note 93. 
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cases.101  Another intended effect of the bill was to protect state apology 
laws that conflict with Rule 408.102  However, there were disagreements 
as to whether the language for the full apology should be written into the 
bill, whether the language should specifically define how the bill would 
preempt state law, or whether Congress’s power to regulate interstate 
commerce103 would make such language redundant.104  As it were, the 
full apology language never made it into the final version of the bill, 
effectively rendering the bill a protection for partial apologies.105  The bill 
ultimately died in committee.106
Consistent with the results of Robbennolt’s study,107 Colorado became 
the first state to pass an apology statute that protected full apologies 
delivered in medical malpractice cases from admissibility.108  To date, 
Colorado is one among only four states to protect full apologies.109  The 
Colorado statute provides, in relevant part: 
In any civil action brought by an alleged victim of an unanticipated outcome of 
medical care, or in any arbitration proceeding related to such civil action, any 
and all statements, affirmations, gestures, or conduct expressing apology, fault, 
sympathy, commiseration, condolence, compassion, or a general sense of 
benevolence which are made by a health care provider or an employee of a 
health care provider to the alleged victim, [or the victim’s relatives or 
representatives] and which relate to the discomfort, pain, suffering, injury, or 
death of the alleged victim as the result of the unanticipated outcome of medical 
care shall be inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability . . . .110
 101. National Medical Error Disclosure and Compensation Program, S. 1784, 109th 
Cong. § 935(d)(1)(B) (2005). 
 102. Telephone Interview with Doug Wojcieszak, supra note 93. 
 103. The power to regulate interstate commerce is a power granted exclusively to 
Congress by the U.S. Constitution.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 104. Telephone Interview with Doug Wojcieszak, supra note 93. 
105. See supra Part II for Author’s definition of partial apology.  Similar to the 
aforementioned state apology laws that do not protect an admission of fault, the bill 
sought to protect expressions of remorse.  National Medical Error Disclosure and 
Compensation Program, S. 1784, 109th Cong. § 935(d)(1)(B) (2005).  The bill read, 
in relevant part: 
An agreement that any apology or expression of remorse by a doctor or other 
designated health care provider at any time during the negotiations shall be 
kept confidential and shall not be used in any subsequent legal proceedings as 
an admission of guilt if such negotiations end without an offer of compensation 
that is acceptable to both parties. 
Id.
 106. Telephone Interview with Doug Wojcieszak, supra note 93. 
107. See Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement, supra note 13, at 491 
(discussing the ineffectiveness of partial apologies in encouraging settlement); see also
discussion supra Part IV. 
108. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Toward Candor After Medical Error: The First 
Apology Law, 5 HARV. HEALTH POL’Y REV. 21, 22 (2004). 
 109. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2605 (Supp. 2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-
184d(b) (Supp. 2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-37.1 (Supp. 2005). 
 110. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135(1) (2005). 
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As Colorado’s law protects full apologies, it should theoretically decrease 
the incidence of medical malpractice suits.111  As a state privilege, 
however, Colorado’s statute is not guaranteed deference in federal courts 
in cases involving federal causes of action.  By way of illustration, a 
Colorado evidentiary statute was recently put to the test in federal courts 
in a medical malpractice case.112  Noting the Supreme Court’s caution 
that a state’s evidentiary privilege should not be recognized or applied 
unless it promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need 
for probative evidence, the court held that such a privilege does not bar 
discovery requests in a federal case involving pendent state jurisdiction.113
Thus, Colorado’s apology legislation, similar to apology legislation in 
every other state, does not have guaranteed protection for either partial 
or full apologies.  As a consequence, defense attorneys will likely have 
little confidence in the reliability of state apology laws.  Much like the 
original intent of the National MEDiC Act, the amendment to Rule 408 
proposed in this Article would effectively assuage such doubts through 
creation of a protected space between parties, and this protection would 
also work to encourage private settlements. 
VI. CRITIQUES OF APOLOGY LAWS
Critics of such apology laws, most notably Lee Taft, are concerned 
that the sympathetic statements protected by apology laws may become 
insincere, commodifying114 behavior that manipulates harmed parties 
111. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example 
from Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 1447, 1447 (2000); Hickson et al., 
supra note 29, at 1359; Vincent et al., supra note 29, at 1609; Witman et al., supra note 
29, at 2566; see also supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 112. Atteberry v. Longmont United Hosp., 221 F.R.D. 644, 646 (D. Colo. 2004). 
113. Id. at 646–47. 
114. See Taft, supra note 13, at 1146.  Taft acknowledges and opposes the use of 
apology as a commodity: “[A]pology is frequently commodified in the legal arena, 
where a moral process can become a market trade.”  Id.  Taft cites a Missouri Supreme 
Court case, in which a Missouri attorney, who was held in contempt and ordered into 
custody, had the contempt decree vacated after she apologized.  Id. at 1146–47 (citing In 
re Coe, 903 S.W.2d 916, 916 (Mo. 1995) (en banc)).  The same attorney was later found 
guilty of professional misconduct and initially suspended from practice for six months, 
but after issuing a public apology, she was instead given only a public reprimand.  In re 
Coe, 903 S.W.2d at 918, 921 (Covington, J., dissenting).  According to Taft, the 
attorney’s behavior demonstrates that when apology is used only as a commodity, its 
moral value is vitiated.  Taft, supra note 13, at 1147; see also Cohen, supra note 13.  
Cohen also acknowledges that the moral process has become an economic tool in that a 
victim “may be less likely to sue if she receives an apology, and even if she does sue, an 
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into being duped into accepting too little compensation,115 thereby 
obviating the moral purpose of apology.  In Apology Subverted: The 
Commodification of Apology, Taft argues that when civil defendants 
make apologies under the protection of statutes which exclude them 
from admission as evidence, the apology loses its moral purpose: 
When lawyers, legislators, judges, and mediators disrupt this [moral dialectic] 
process by viewing apology in utilitarian terms, they subvert the moral potential 
of apology in the legal arena.  When the performer of apology is protected from 
the consequences of the performance through carefully crafted statements and 
legislative directives, the moral thrust of apology is lost.  The potential for 
meaningful healing through apologetic discourse is lost when the moral 
component of the syllogistic process in which apology is situated is erased for 
strategic reasons.116
In regards to such apologies being both insincere and delivered for 
strategic reasons, these apologies are not necessarily ineffective because: 
[T]o be successful, an apology must meet the needs of the offended party, such 
as the restoration of dignity, acknowledgement of shared values, reparations, 
and the like.  To believe that a “pragmatic” apology is somehow less truthful or 
less effective than a more impassioned one is to value style over substance, as if 
we believe that the manner in which an apology is delivered is more important 
[than] the goals it seeks to achieve. . . .  As long as an apology meets important 
psychological needs of the offended, . . . we should not diminish its effectiveness by 
becoming critics.117
Moreover, arguing that almost all apologies offered in efforts to 
avoid litigation have a degree of insincerity, Wagatsuma and Rosett 
contend that sensible Americans would do well to recognize that an 
apology is a useful tool in dispute resolution, even if there is some doubt 
about an apology’s sincerity.118  Indeed, Wagatsuma and Rosett go on to 
argue that “[a] process built around apology and compensation would fit 
well into a justice system that increasingly seeks to resolve conflicts by 
apology could help facilitate settlement.”  Id.  Apology is thus regarded as a bargaining 
chip that correlates to the amount of the settlement. 
115. See Cohen, supra note 12, at 1015–17; Cohen, supra note 14, at 825; see also
O’Hara & Yarn, supra note 13, at 1186 (“[A]pology can be used as a tool for 
organizations to strategically take advantage of individual victims’ instincts to forgive in 
the face of apology.”); Levi, supra note 13, at 1171 (“For instance, critics might ask, if a 
plaintiff settles because she’s emotionally fulfilled by an apology, isn’t she being duped 
out of her legal entitlement—an entitlement that the apology itself makes concrete?”).  
There is also some empirical evidence that suggests the existence of an apology “script,” 
in that the offender’s apology will be followed by the recipient’s forgiveness of that 
apology.  See Mark Bennett & Christopher Dewberry, “I’ve Said I’m Sorry, Haven’t I?”  
A Study of the Identity Implications and Constraints That Apologies Create for Their 
Recipients, 13 CURRENT PSYCHOL. 10, 11 (1994). 
 116. Taft, supra note 13, at 1157. 
117. See AARON LAZARE, ON APOLOGY 157–58 (2004) (discussing the growing 
importance of public and private apologies in U.S. culture). 
118. See, e.g., Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 477, 495. 
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settlement, mediation, or alternative methods of dispute resolution, 
rather than trial.”119
Given that no one can divine the motivations and emotional responses 
of those individuals who agree to resolve their dispute through apology, 
no one can say with any degree of certainty whether the harmed party is, 
in fact, being “duped.”120  Consequently, the party who is supposedly 
being duped is also arguably taking into consideration the fact that an 
apology delivered in an effort to forgo litigation might not be completely 
sincere.  The harmed party is therefore simply concluding that the apology, 
discounted by the possibility that it might be insincere, is worth more 
than the larger award out of which it is allegedly being duped, because 
otherwise the harmed party would simply sue despite the apology. 
Taft further argues that “when the legal evidentiary ‘impediment’ of 
admission is removed, the moral dimension of apology is entirely 
eclipsed.”121  In response, it is not entirely clear what moral dimension is 
being referenced, and it is unclear whether moral dimensionality is even 
an appropriate metric to utilize.  This moral dimension could be Zoroastrian, 
Judeo-Christian, Humanist, Atheist, or the myriad other teleological 
beliefs that inform the concept of morality.  Regardless of the moral 
dimension relied upon, instead of referring solely to metaphysical concepts 
as a base from which to critique the viability of such legal mechanisms, 
it may be more instructive to gauge fairness by what the two parties in a 
dispute perceive to be a fair resolution.  Notably, this is precisely the 
metric that the Advisory Committee contemplates as the overriding 
policy priority in their construction of Rule 408.122  This is not to suggest 
that morality has no place in this discussion, though, because parties 
remain free to end compromise negotiations whenever they feel the 
negotiation is in bad faith.  Moreover, neither party is barred from 
having an attorney present to see to the client’s best interests during said 
negotiations.  However, in critiquing the effects of a rule, such as the one 
this Article proposes, it is more apropos to look to the legislative intent 
of Rule 408—which is to create a protected space between parties so as 
119. Id. at 495 (citing Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal 
Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 789 (1984)). 
 120. Taft, supra note 13, at 1159 (arguing that harmed parties must not be “duped 
into trading [their] resentment for the [offender’s] gain”); see also Levi, supra note 115 
and accompanying text.  For Taft to suggest some of these individuals are being “duped” 
may be quite insulting to their intelligence.  White, supra note 13, at 1296. 
 121. Taft, supra note 13, at 1150. 
122. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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to encourage private settlement123—rather than look to the intent of 
one’s own particular teleological perspective.
VII. CONCLUSION
Debates about relationships between apology and law are intense in 
part because stakeholders with different interests and world views make 
different assumptions about the extent to which changes in legal rules 
can encourage private settlements between adversarial parties.  This 
Article has suggested that apologies are an important dispute resolution 
tool.  An amendment to Rule 408, which would prevent full apologies 
offered during compromise negotiations from being admissible in civil 
cases, would encourage private settlements.  Although some scholars assert 
that a fully protected apology is fraught with moral ambiguity, evidence 
suggests that such an assertion is flawed.  Growing evidence suggests 
that the fully protected apology is both good business and consistent 
with U.S. cultural values. 
Often, lawsuits begin with an offender who would like to apologize, 
but who also fears a lawsuit.  He then refrains from apologizing, and the 
absence of this apology is precisely what triggers the lawsuit.124
Consistent with the underlying policy priority of Rule 408, this Article’s 
proposed amendment to Rule 408 effectively limits such a fear of suit by 
creating a federally protected space between parties which encourages 
private settlement, thereby conserving the judicial resources consumed 
by litigation. 
123. Id.
124. See Cohen, supra note 12, at 1011. 
